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What are the characteristics of effective ground force commander (GFC) decision 
making? What commonalities do we see? What are best practices for pre-mission 
preparation and mission execution? This thesis focuses on GFC decision making in order 
to investigate how to better prepare leaders for the current operating environment. It 
examines tactical-level decision making under conditions of uncertainty. It does so by 
drawing on interviews with combat-experienced commanders. An examination of their 
thought processes while leading tactical combat elements reveals that mental preparation, 
vicarious experience, and complex, repetitive training are key components of effective 
GFC decision making. The thesis concludes with recommendations about how to enhance 
GFC decision making for future volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) 
environments.     
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I. VIGNETTE, PURPOSE, LITERATURE REVIEW, 
METHODOLOGY 
It was still dark when the men of Charlie Platoon, SEAL Team 
TEN, left the compound with members of the 3rd Company, 1st 
Commando Kandaks, passing the HESCO-barriers of the Afghan base in a 
dusty column of dented pickup trucks and tan MRAPs.1 The massive 
vehicles had remote-controlled weapons turrets on top, and V-shaped 
underbellies below to shunt explosive blasts away from the interior. The 
sun was at least an hour away from rising over the mountains to the east, 
but the night vision goggles worn by the SEALs revealed the barren 
landscape enough for them to navigate until daylight actually broke.   
Nicolas “Nacho” Nevarez munched on some turkey jerky in the 
navigator seat of the lead MRAP, listening to the chatter on the main inter-
team communication net. He looked over at the driver, Mason, one of the 
Charlie Platoon breachers.    
“Keep an eye on the ‘Ghans, but this looks like a good track. 
Another ten clicks at least. Objective HARNESS WHISPER IV. Who 
thinks these names up?” Nicolas said. Mason grunted his agreement and 
spat Copenhagen into an empty water bottle.  
From the back seat, the voice of their chief, Eric Harper, boomed 
out, “Welp, if we’d found him on one of the first three times we tried to do 
this op, we wouldn’t be having this discussion, would we?”   
“You think we can, Harp?” Mason asked. “Get him, that is?” The 
MRAP hit a massive hole in the dirt path, and the men jostled against their 
seat restraints.   
Harp shrugged. “If we can get containment set soon enough this 
time, none of the ‘Ghans tip him off this time, and maybe ten other things 
break our way. But, hey, I’m an optimist.”  
Thirty minutes later, Chris “CK” Kent, Charlie Platoon’s Officer in 
Charge, sitting in the rear of the trail MRAP, looked at the map under the 
light of a red lens flashlight with bleary, blood-shot eyes. He had his inter-
team radio turned down low, the sporadic radio traffic murmuring in his 
ears like the far-off sound of ocean surf. CK went over the contingencies 
                                                 
1 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected, an armored vehicle.  
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in his head for the umpteenth time since they’d finished the final mission 
brief and ROC2 drill the day before. He looked over at Jonas, his Air 
Force JTAC,3 who sat opposite him in the back of the MRAP.   
“Hey bud, any movement in the village?” CK asked.   
Jonas shook his head “No,” his wispy and patchy beard shaking 
back and forth as he did. He’d put a few plastic beads on some braided 
strands of hair as a joke. “A few movers between some of the buildings, 
but no one’s left the village proper since we put the first Pred overhead 
yesterday evening.”   
CK nodded. He turned one of his radios up and called out to Harp 
on the command net, “ISR4 reports no movement in the village. How far 
out are we?”   
A moment’s pause, then Harp responded, “five to ten minutes, give 
or take what we find around this next bend.”   
“Check,” CK replied.   
“Hey LT, I’m getting some ICOM5 chatter,” Fitch, one of his non-
SEAL “enablers” reported.   
“Anything good?” CK asked, turning up his other radio, which 
immediately filled his other ear with voices.  
“The Taliban can see our convoy—word’s going out right now.”  
CK frowned. The sun was still maybe twenty to thirty minutes 
from rising, and some vigilant observers were now compromising their 
element of surprise. Not that this was a surprise—the Taliban in this area 
had an outstanding early warning (EW) network. “Roger, keep me 
posted.”  
CK thought about the worst-case scenario for the assault. It had to 
be an IED strike on one of the lightly protected pickups driven by their 
partner force.  
                                                 
2 Rehearsal Of Concept. 
3 Joint Terminal Attack Controller. 
4 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. 
5 A two-way radio utilized by the Taliban. 
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“Movement in the northwest corner of the village,” Jonas said, 
looking down at his map of the village and surrounding area. “Several 
personnel are out and about.”   
CK’s MRAP crested around the final bend in the road, and he 
could see the entire convoy spread out, the village just beyond it.   
“Harp, have the terp (interpreter) tell the ‘Ghans to hold up—I 
need a minute,” CK said over the radio to his platoon chief.   
“LT, the ‘Ghans wanna put the pedal down, and I say let ‘em. We 
need to get this place locked down before the sun comes up,” Harp 
responded.   
“Just humor me—I need a few minutes,” CK answered back, and 
then looked over at his communicator. “Ask the JOC6 for that flight of A-
10s, and I want the CASEVAC7 birds to go to level-one readiness.”  
“Two movers have left the town and are making their way up to 
what looks like a fighting position on the finger to the north of the 
village,” Jonas said aloud, then repeated it over the common inter-team 
net.  
Rick, the Communicator and one of the newest members of the 
platoon, passed the traffic to the JOC over SATCOM8 and gave him 
thumbs up.   
“CK…,” Harp trailed off.  
“Just give it a minute,” CK replied calmly. Moving the CASEVAC 
birds to level one would cut their response time from fifty minutes to 
fifteen, and the A-10s would be a game changer if things went sideways.   
CK had a bad feeling about what they were rolling up on, and he 
had long ago learned to listen to such a feeling. Tense minutes passed until 
finally the JOC reported the A-10s on the way and the birds at level-one, 
their highest level of readiness without taking flight.   
“OK, send ‘em, let’s go.” 
CK could see a glow off to the east that heralded dawn. The 
Afghan pickups moved to their positions with a surprising level of 
6 Joint Operations Center. 
7 Casualty Evacuation. 
8 Satellite Communications. 
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purpose, and CK was thankful the ‘Ghans had physically acted out moving 
to their respective positions during the ROC drill, followed by the platoon 
conducting a sand table exercise with key leaders from the Commandos. 
They war-gamed out the enemy’s likely actions and reactions to their 
maneuvers.   
A loud boom broke the quiet, followed quickly by the staccato 
chatter of a machine gun. It sounded like a PKM,9 and it sounded like it 
was coming from the fighting position on the ridge. Harp’s MRAP already 
had its turret gun focused in on the fighting position and quickly answered 
back, the steady bass from the fifty caliber rounds drowning out the more 
jittery sounds from the 7.62mm PKM. A line from Kipling’s “Arithmetic 
on the Frontier” came to CK unbidden, from the depths of his mind—The 
flying bullet down the pass, that whistles clear: ‘All flesh is grass.’10  
“A-10s are checking on station, and we’ve got movement all over 
the village now,” Jonas said, in between giving the flight lead of the A-10s 
a situation brief over the fires net.   
Since Jonas was busy, CK talked to the Pred operator directly and 
had the asset shift focus to the high ground surrounding the village. 
Immediately, the drone operator located several groups of people moving 
on the ridge to the west and north. A huge boom rattled the MRAP, jolting 
everyone inside.  
“One of the ‘Ghans’s trucks hit an IED,11 we’re sending Jake out 
there now,” Harp reported tersely. Jake was their Explosive Ordinance 
Disposal technician, a man worth his weight in gold, and then some.    
 “We have multiple wounded partner force, CK. Blast frag damage 
and gunshot wounds,” Harp reported.   
“Roger,” he replied. “Spinning up the birds now—I’ll let you know 
when they’re a few minutes out.”   
Harp keyed his hand mike twice to acknowledge he’d heard. CK 
looked at Rick and nodded.   
“Pass the nine-line and the MIST report to the JOC and get ‘em in 
the air,” CK listened as one of his team leaders reported fire from the 
                                                 
9 Russian machine gun, similar to the American M60 or Mk48. 
10 Rudyard Kipling, “Arithmetic on the Frontier, Poem in full available at 
http://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poems_arith.htm.   
11 Improvised Explosive Device. 
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ridgeline. He was glad their training prior to deployment had been so 
rigorous and comprehensive—full of contingencies and deviations from 
the briefed plan. At the time, he’d thought it was a bit over the top, but 
now all the chaos was more manageable because of it. 
“Jonas, let’s get the A-10s in on those firing positions—make sure 
their run-in angle is good to go.”   
The next ten minutes passed quickly as the SEALs and 
Commandos maneuvered around the compound and looked for the sources 
of incoming fire.   
The sounds of gunfire intensified, and CK wondered what it 
sounded like on the other end of the radio. He had taken great pains to 
ensure that Rick sounded cool and precise when speaking on the radio. CK 
had taken Rick on several PT sessions, grueling runs in the hills outside 
their FOB where he made Rick recite CASEVAC nine-lines and other 
mission calls out loud until CK was satisfied that Rick would project 
nothing but calm over the radio.   
“Damn, look at Harp,” Jonas said, pointing out the window.  
The MRAP holding Harp, Nicolas, and Mason drove straight 
towards a PKM nest on the edge of the village. Jonas and CK watched 
Harp open the back door and toss a fragmentation grenade into the nest 
before Mason gunned the MRAP in reverse, out of the blast zone. The frag 
exploded, and the PKM chattered no more.   
“Ah, ahem,” Harp called out on the command net, clearing his 
throat.  “CK, we have a little issue over here.” 
“You mean besides your pitching precision?”  CK responded, 
prompting chuckles.   
“Yeah, so we took a few rounds in the radiator. We’re good to go 
right now, but Mason thinks this thing will overheat in ten minutes, tops. 
Recommend we pull it back and get ready to tow it,” Harp reported.  
“Roger, I agree, just get it to a good position and let’s finish the 
CASEVAC. Then we can look at getting out of here. The birds are three 
mikes out; are those wounded ‘Ghans ready to go?” CK asked. 
“Affirm, they’re four hundred yards down the slope to the east 
with one of the Recce guys,” Harp said.  
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CK heard the Recce team-member talking the helo onto the 
landing zone while Jonas reported the A-10s were Winchester12 from 
multiple gun runs. He then took a moment to update his boss, Commander 
Josh Reynolds, in the JOC sixty miles to the east, over the SATCOM net. 
CK conveyed his intent to exfil,13 and Josh replied with a simple “Charlie 
Mike,” or continue mission. CK was grateful once again that, thanks to his 
last deployment as assistant ops in the JOC, he understood what 
information to convey to put his boss in his comfort zone. 
Long minutes passed, then the platoon’s Afghan partners loaded 
their pickups, and Harp and the boys rigged the MRAP for tow. The 
MRAP was still drivable, for now, but the engine temp was slowly rising. 
Of HARNESS WHISPER, there was no trace. A villager told one of the 
Afghans who relayed it to the SEALs’ interpreter that the target was up 
north somewhere. 
*** 
It had been no smashing success, this operation, but they’d killed 
several fighters and mitigated as much risk as possible. The fact that some 
of his Afghans had been injured grated on CK, but at least they were in 
good hands now. The rest of the Commandos wanted to keep fighting, but 
CK knew he had made the right call to withdraw. 
 
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis will focus on the decision-making process of Ground Force 
Commanders (GFCs) in order to investigate how best to prepare leaders for environments 
like the one described above. In particular, the thesis will focus on tactical level decision 
making under conditions of uncertainty. The ultimate aim is to help combat leaders better 
prepare themselves and their units for this unforgiving, chaotic environment. With that 
purpose in mind, my research questions are: what are the characteristics of effective GFC 
decision making? What commonalities do we see? What best practices for pre-mission 
preparation and mission execution should we adopt? To answer these questions, I 
interviewed 21 combat-experienced tactical leaders from within the student population at 
                                                 
12 Empty of ammunition. 
13 Short for “exfiltrate” (i.e., depart the area). 
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Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), and asked each a series of questions in order to better 
understand their thought processes when they were in command of a tactical combat 
element and found themselves in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) 
situation or environment.  
1. Background: The U.S. Army Operating Concept
In October 2014, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
unveiled a concept entitled “Win in a Complex World,” designed to assist the force as it 
looks ahead to where it might operate in the coming decades.14 Building on this concept, 
the United States Army Combined Arms Center produced “The Human Dimension White 
Paper:  A Framework for Optimizing Human Performance,” a document that stresses the 
volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) nature of the current operating 
environment and the need to prepare leaders to deal with an ever-growing degree of 
uncertainty.15 The document’s implications for military leaders are captured by the 
following quote: 
It is not enough for leaders to tolerate or even grow comfortable with the 
uncertainty described in the future environment. Operating in this complex 
environment requires agile, adaptive, and ethical leaders trained and 
educated to improve and thrive in uncertainty. These leaders must possess 
a natural inclination for disruptive innovation and an abiding sense of 
urgency both in times of crisis and times of opportunity. They must be 
professionals of strong character, physically supreme, and resilient to 
overcome the effects of the great trauma that is the experience of war. The 
Army must empower Soldiers not only with exquisite technology, but also 
with broad cultural understanding, professional judgment, critical 
thinking, and technical skills, so that they can adapt to unforeseen and 
unpredictable conditions as they emerge.16 
This passage raises the following relevant questions: what changes should be 
instituted to accomplish this? How can we better prepare our tactical leaders for the 
14  Army Operating Concept: Win In A Complex World, Fort Eustis, VA, Training and Doctrine 
Command, 2014, 7.  
15 The Human Dimension White Paper: A Framework for Optimizing Human Performance, October 9, 
2014, 8. This is informed by Army Operating Concept: Win In A Complex World, 15.   
16 The Human Dimension White Paper: A Framework for Optimizing Human Performance, 10. 
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uncertain and unpredictable waters in which they must proverbially (and sometimes 
literally) swim? In other words, how do we prepare them to cope with being unprepared? 
2. The VUCA Environment 
The term VUCA was first employed by the U.S. Army in 2002 to characterize the 
current operating environment writ large.17 The business community then quickly 
adopted the term. The following is a brief overview of its components:18  
Volatility is created by instability in both the rate of change of information and 
the specifics of a given situation. Uncertainty refers to both the inability to have 
complete understanding of a given situation and the difficulty in forecasting the effects of 
a proposed change. In a complex environment, numerous factors affect the situation; 
Arguably, causal links and second- and third-order effects will continue to grow more 
complex in our hyper-globalized world. Ambiguity occurs when a decision maker does 
not understand the significance of a given event or situation. It can also occur when the 
implications and consequences of an event can be interpreted in more than one way. 
VUCA is graphically depicted in Figure 1.  
                                                 
17 Steven Shambach, Strategic Leadership Primer, 2nd ed. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 
2004), 12; Shambach makes reference to Owen Jacobs’ Strategic Leadership, published in 2002 as the 
origin of the term VUCA.  
18 Shambach, Strategic Leadership Primer, 12. 
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Figure 1.  Depiction of VUCA Concept.19 
3. Coming to Terms
Although a ubiquitous term in the Special Operations community, no doctrinal 
definition for Ground Force Commander (GFC) exists among SEALs, Special Forces, 
Rangers, or Special Mission Units. The term Command and Control  (C2) perhaps comes 
closest to describing a GFC’s responsibilities and authorities. It is defined thusly in Joint 
Publication 1-02, the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms:  
19 Source: Bennett and Lemoine, “What VUCA Really Means for You,” https://hbr.org/2014/01/what-
vuca-really-means-for-you/ar/1. 
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Command and Control: The exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 
accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2.20 
The arena in which a commander exercises C2 is one of uncertainty and temporal 
constraints.21 For the purposes of this thesis, a ground force commander is defined as the 
senior officer, either commissioned or noncommissioned, in command of a tactical level 
combat element outside of a secured forward operating base.   
B. LITERATURE REVIEW—THEORIES OF DECISION MAKING 
Theories about decision making can be broadly divided into two categories:  
prescriptive (sometimes referred to as normative) and descriptive.22 Prescriptive theories 
attempt to articulate the “preferred” method of making decisions, when ideal quantities of 
both information and time are available. In contrast, descriptive theories illustrate how 
people make decisions under “real world” conditions, with all of real world’s associated 
uncertainty and time constraints.  
Another way to distinguish between types of decision making is to focus on three 
sets of conditions or domains—certainty, risk, and uncertainty.23   
1. Prescriptive Theories 
Decision-making under certainty occurs when there is certain knowledge about 
the outcomes of any given alternative. Decision-makers will typically act to maximize the 
utility value of choices under these circumstances. In the domain of certainty, prescriptive 
theories of decision making are usually ideal.   
                                                 
20 Department of Defense,  Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 
1–02) (Washington, DC: Joint Doctrine Branch, 2010), 40. 
21 Department of the Navy, Naval Command and Control (NDP 6) (Washington, DC: Chief of Naval 
Operations, 1995), 11. 
22  Human Dimension Capabilities Development Task Force Capabilities Development Integration 
Directorate Mission Command Center of Excellence (MC CoE), Cognitive Biases and Decision-Making: A 
Literature Review and Discussion of Implications for the U.S. Army, 10.  
23 Readings in Defense Resource Management (Boston, MA: Pearson Learning Solutions, 2014), 270.  
11 
a. Subjective Expected Utility
This model is employed by economists, statisticians, and operations research 
(OR) experts to model decision making. The Subjective Expected Utility model assumes 
that each decision-maker possesses a “utility function” or means of quantifying the 
desirability of various outcomes.24 With this model, a decision-maker ranks his choices 
according to how options will maximize his personal utility. A key assumption of this 
model is that the decision-maker is aware of all potential alternatives.   
b. Rational Actor
Also known as Rational Choice, this model assumes that “individuals choose the 
best action according to unchanging and stable preference functions and constraints.”25 
These assumptions are sometimes violated by real world conditions that are too varied to 
be adequately captured by the model. This model typically focuses on aggregate 
outcomes rather than individual decisions in an attempt to discover the causes behind the 
decisions. Many economists contend that humans are “utility maximizing” and make 
choices based on unchanging preferences after gathering ideal amounts of information.26 
c. Bounded Rationality
In his seminal 1957 work, Models of Man, Herbert Simon coined the term 
“bounded rationality” to denote the status of an agent or actor whose imperfect 
knowledge is shaped by his/her experience and knowledge, and who uses his/her 
knowledge to construct a simplified model of the world. The agent/actor subsequently 
makes decisions in accordance with that imperfect model and limited search time. Thus, 
while the result might not be an optimal representation of the larger reality, the agent/
actor is seen to conduct him/herself rationally because of his/ her fidelity to this model.27   
24 “Improving the Decision-Making Abilities of Small Unit Leaders,” 52. 
25 Ibid., 54.  
26 Ibid., 54. 
27 Herbert Alexander Simon, Models of Man : Social and Rational; Mathematical Essays on Rational 
Human Behavior in a Social Setting (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), p198-199. 
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2. Descriptive Theories 
Decision-making under risk is akin to a game of chance, such as blackjack or 
craps. In this situation, a probability is known for each potential outcome. Just as when 
conditions are certain, a decision maker can be expected to make choices to either 
maximize his or her expected utility or minimize potential losses by employing a formula 
to calculate outcomes. An argument can be made that either descriptive or prescriptive 
techniques of decision making can be employed in this domain.   
Finally, decision making under conditions of uncertainty is characterized by the 
presence of multiple alternative courses-of-action, none of which enable the decision 
maker to calculate the probability of success or failure. Uncertainty presents the most 
difficult environment to navigate.28 
Some scholars divide uncertainty itself into several categories according to 
whether decision makers encounter data that is conflicting, missing (incomplete), or 
ambiguous.29 Under such conditions, prescriptive theories of decision making lack 
explanatory and predictive power, and descriptive theories rise to the fore.30 
a. Heuristics and Biases 
 Some academics who study decision making reject the idea that humans employ 
a specific checklist-like framework to navigate difficult decisions; they contend that 
humans instead employ heuristics.31 A heuristic is a rule of thumb used to make 
decisions in an environment of uncertainty. Employing a heuristic is said to be “frugal” in 
                                                 
28 Readings Defense Resource Management. 272. Some decision makers employ criteria analysis 
tools, such as Minimax, Maximin, Hurwicz, and LaPlace to further illuminate possible outcomes. 
29 Lawrence G. Shattuck, Nita Lewis Miller, and Kacey E. Kemmerer, “Tactical Decision-Making 
under Conditions of Uncertainty: An Empirical Study,” in Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, vol. 53 (SAGE Publications, 2009): 243; Michael J. McCloskey, “An 
Analysis of Uncertainty in the Marine Corps,” in Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Society Annual Meeting, vol. 40 (SAGE Publications, 1996): p194–98. 
30 “Improving the Decision-Making Abilities of Small Unit Leaders” published by the National 
Research Council in 2012 and the “Cognitive Biases and Decision-Making” White Paper published by the 
U.S. Army Human Dimension Capabilities Development Task Force in 2015 are both excellent reviews 
regarding decision-making theories.  
31 Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten, Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2002), 7.  
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terms of time and cognitive effort expended.32 However, one danger with employing a 
heuristic is that it can create cognitive bias. For example, a common heuristic is the 
“availability heuristic,” which describes how quickly something comes to a person’s 
mind when thinking about a given topic, concept, or method.33  
Several potential cognitive biases can result from the availability heuristic. One is 
the retrievability bias, a fixation on the recent past or recent memory. Another is known 
as search set bias—the creation of a pattern of investigation that constrains and bounds 
our thinking unnecessarily. For instance, an example of search set bias is soldiers 
searching for an IED maker by focusing only on homes along a road frequently mined 
with IEDs.34 
b. Dual Process Cognition
In Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman discusses the existence of “Dual 
Process” thinking.35 He posits two systems at work in human cognition. System One 
thinking is automatic, unconscious, intuitive, and relies upon tacit knowledge and pattern 
recognition for rapid decision making. System Two thinking is controlled, conscious, 
reflective, and employs explicit knowledge; decisions are made after a period of 
deliberative thought. Kahneman asserts that humans utilize System One for the majority 
of day-to-day decisions, only resorting to System Two when confronted with a 
problem that System One thinking cannot solve. Kahneman believes that dual system 
thinking is a default setting the human brain—an evolutionarily advantageous 
effort to save cognitive resources, as well as time.   
32 Gerd Gigerenzer and Daniel Goldstein, “Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way,” Psychological 
Review 103, no. 4 (1996): 652. 
33 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability,” Cognitive Psychology 5 (1973): 207. 
34 Blair Williams, “Heuristics and Biases in Military Decision-Making,” Military Review (September-
October 2010): 43. 
35 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York:Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011), p20-21. 
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c. Prospect Theory 
In 1979, Kahneman, along with Amos Taversky, developed prospect theory (PT), 
which stands in stark contrast to the subjective expected utility model.36 Simply put, PT 
asserts that the “frame” or manner in which decisions are presented and construed by the 
decision maker plays a key role in decision making. According to Kahneman and 
Taversky, humans tend to be more risk-averse when decisions are framed in terms of 
“gain” and more prone to take risk when decisions are framed in terms of “loss.”37 For 
example, when given the choice between A:(definitely gaining $10) or B:(a 50/50 chance 
of winning either nothing or $20), experiment subjects chose to take the $10, the safer 
option. However, when given the option of A:(definitely losing $10), or B:(a 50/50 
chance of losing either nothing or $20), most participants in experiments elected to take 
option B—the riskier option. Also, this theory posits that humans take losses more 
seriously than they do the equivalent gains—losing $20 is more painful than the pleasure 
of gaining $20.38  
d. Naturalistic Decision Making  
Unlike PT, which has been developed through experimentation, naturalistic 
decision making (NDM) attempts to describe decision making under real world 
conditions.39 Three major criteria are critical to NDM: 
• the expertise of the decision maker 
• “field” conditions 
• the conditions of complexity and uncertainty that complicate decision 
making  
NDM considers intuition to be an integral component of how practitioners 
actually make decisions. NDM does not regard intuition as a sort of super-natural ability. 
                                                 
36 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” 
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 47, No.2 (1979): 264. 
37 Ibid., 268. 
38 Ibid., 279. 
39 Klein, “Naturalistic Decision-Making,” Human Factors, vol. 50, no. 3 (2008):  456. 
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Rather, it is developed through extensive practice.40 For instance, the intuitive skills of a 
surgeon might be based on two decades of wielding a surgical blade. Research in the 
realm of NDM has shed light on what was formerly a mysterious process by identifying 
the cues that experts use to make decisions.41 Tacit or informal knowledge, rather than 
explicit or formal knowledge, has been found to play a critical role in how experts 
quickly assess a situation and reach an accurate judgment. NDM typically is employed in 
situations marked by the following characteristics:42  
• “ill-structured” problems
• incomplete, ambiguous, or changing information
• shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals
• decisions as part of a multi-event feedback loop
• time constraints
• high stakes
• many stakeholders are involved
e. Recognition-Primed Decision Making
For decades, the U.S. Marine Corps has employed recognition-primed decision-
making (RPD), which grew out of NDM research. It is a decision-making technique that 
leverages individual experiences to “pattern match.” When encountering a new situation, 
Marines are supposed to draw on their prior experience for suitable analogues.43 The 
U.S. Army has also incorporated naturalistic decision making, and RPD in particular, into 
40 Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klein, “Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A Failure to Disagree,” 
American Psychologist 64, No.6 (2009): 516. 
41 “Improving the Decision-Making Abilities of Small Unit Leaders,” 57. 
42 Judith Orasanu and Terry Connolly, The Reinvention of Decision-Making (Westport, CT: Ablex 
Publishing, 1993), 19. 
43 Kahneman and Klein, “Conditions for Intuitive Expertise”: 516; Department of the Navy, 
Command and Control (MCDP6) (Washington, DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1996), 109. 
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their doctrine.44 In one study, NDM researchers found that fire ground commanders used 
RPD for 80–90 percent of the situations they encountered.45 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Borrowing from these various theories about decision making, I crafted a set of 
interview questions, in order to investigate the tacit or implicit knowledge that tactical-
level leaders possess. One-on-one interviews were conducted in a secured study room, 
with the exception of one interview conducted over the telephone due to a scheduling 
conflict. Interviewees consisted of a convenience sample recruited from among the 
officer population at NPS in Monterey, California; all volunteered. I conducted a total of 
21 interviews, which ranged from thirty minutes to two hours in length. I then transcribed 
all interview notes and looked for underlying patterns in the data. I also examined the 
data for dominant themes, which were themes that emerged repetitively across multiple 
questions. These dominant themes fell into three main categories.  
1. Selection Bias
Despite the fact that my potential subject population was limited to personnel 
attending NPS, I obtained a fairly diverse cross-section of participants. These included 
Army Special Forces officers, Army Ranger officers, Naval Special Warfare officers, 
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) officers, and Marine Infantry officers. 
The sample also included four international students, hailing from both SOF and 
conventional units on two continents. The list of interview questions can be found in 
Appendix A at the end of this thesis. The mean age of the interview subjects was thirty-
six years old, with a mean of fourteen years in the military and a mean of ten years in 
their respective communities (SF, SEAL, MARSOC, etc.). Interviewees averaged five 
44 Carol Ross et al., “The Recognition-Primed Decision Model,” Military Review, August 2004, 8.; 
Gary Klein, “Making Decisions in Natural Environments,” Research and Advanced Concepts Office, U.S. 
Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 17. 
45 Gary A. Klein, Roberta Calderwood, and Anne Clinton-Cirocco, “Rapid Decision-Making on the 
Fire Ground,” in Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, vol. 30 
(1986): 576. 
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overseas deployments totaling nearly thirty months per person, with an average of 240 
operations each over the course of their careers thus far.  
For the purposes of my survey, an operation was defined as leaving the secured 
confines of a Forward Operating Base (FOB), in order to perform a presence patrol, 
clearance operation, key leader engagement (KLE), direct action mission, or similar 
military operation in a semi-permissive or non-permissive area.  
In sum, my interviewees represented a very experienced group in terms of time 
spent in tactical-level command leadership positions and in terms of overseas time 
navigating the “fog and friction” of the deployed environment. 
2. Roadmap
Looking ahead, Chapter II will answer my first set of research questions: what are 
the characteristics of effective Ground Force Commander (GFC) decision making? What 
commonalities do we see? Chapter III will address the second question: what should be 
best practices for pre-deployment training and mission execution? In Chapter III I will 
also recount mistakes and lessons learned by the commanders surveyed. Finally, in 
Chapter IV, I will present my conclusions, recommendations, and suggestions for further 
research.  
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II. THREE THEMES FOR EFFECTIVE GFC DECISION-
MAKING 
Circumstances vary so enormously in war, and are so indefinable, that a 
vast array of factors has to be appreciated—mostly in the light of 
probabilities alone. The man responsible for evaluating the whole must 
bring to his task the quality of intuition that perceives the truth at every 
point. Otherwise a chaos of opinions and considerations would arise, and 
fatally entangle judgment. Bonaparte rightly said in this connection that 
many of the decisions faced by the commander-in-chief resemble 
mathematical problems worth of the gifts of a Newton or an Euler.46  
—Carl Von Clausewitz, On War 
In a prescient article published in 1999, U.S. Marine Corps General Charles C. 
Krulak highlighted the need to prepare military leaders for the uncertainty of the modern 
battlefield. In “Cultivating Intuitive Decision-Making,” he writes:  
Napoleon believed that the intuitive ability to rapidly assess the situation 
on the battlefield and make a sound decision was the most important 
quality a commander could possess. He referred to this intuition as coup 
d’oeil, or “the strike of the eye,” and thought that it was a gift of nature. 
More recently, however, practitioners of the military art have come to 
believe that while heredity and personality may well have an impact on an 
individual’s intuitive skills, these skills can also be cultivated and 
developed.47 
The aim of this thesis is to explain how to best foster the cultivation of this 
intuitive decision making, this coup d’oeil. Krulak recommends character development, 
self-study, repetitive skills training, and a supportive command climate.48 Before 
underscoring or adding to his recommendations, let me first identify the key 
46 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 112. 
47 Charles C. Krulak, “Cultivating Intuitive Decisionmaking,” Marine Corps Gazette 83 (May 1999): 
19. 
48 Ibid., 21. 
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characteristics and components of effective Ground Force Commander (GFC) decision 
making. Three key themes emerged from my interviews. None are particularly surprising, 
nor do they represent a critical departure from military orthodoxy when it comes to GFC 
decision making in combat. However, taken together, they suggest that certain small 
improvements in training can pay large dividends in GFC performance on the battlefield.   
The three key themes that were mentioned or alluded to in my interviews 
encompass mental preparation, vicarious experience, and complex, repetitive training. 
Based on my research, these appear to be the main drivers of effective GFC decision 
making. It must be noted that actual, personal experience matters greatly as well. All of 
the GFCs I interviewed had significant personal experience leading tactical-level units. 
The importance of personal experience for improving performance is hardly unique to the 
military commander. In most fields, direct experience can only be gained with time; one 
needs to be afforded time “in the seat,” so to speak. However, since mistakes made while 
gaining this experience in the military can be fatal, it seems particularly important to 
strive for additional ways to enhance a GFC’s decision-making abilities and skills.  
A. MENTAL PREPARATION 
Aequam memento rebus in arduis servare mentem. Remember to keep a 
calm and balanced mind in the face of adversity.49 
—Horace, Odes of Horace 
 
The first qualification of a general-in-chief is to possess a cool head, so 
that things may appear to him in their true proportions and as they really 
are. He should not suffer himself to be unduly affected by good or bad 
news.50 
—Napoleon, Military Maxims of Napoleon 
 
Mental preparation refers to how the interviewees organized their minds to deal 
with the combat environment. Invariably preparation began early in their development, 
                                                 
49 Horace, The Odes of Horace. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 59. 
50 I. Napoleon, Military Maxims of Napoleon (Wiley and Putnam, 1845), verse 73, 11. 
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before or during adolescence, with a “bias for action” developed in some cases through 
childhood experiences in Boy Scouts or sporting endeavors. In reference to ground 
combat, mental preparation consisted of the schema, or mental models, with which GFCs 
prepared themselves; they used these models or schema to “imagine” how they would 
react when faced with uncertainty. 
I played ice hockey, and, to me, it was a good metaphor for war. There is a 
system, a play; you must adjust to an opponent or event. Things will not 
go to plan—your situational awareness is key. At the end of the day, the 
situation on the ground dictates, and you must adjust to varying 
conditions. The GFC is like the coach, you must exploit weaknesses, the 
players have to do their part— it’s like mission command on the ice.  
—An International SOF Officer 
Considerable research has been done on how the stress caused by battlefield chaos 
can hamper decision making of military personnel.51 Individuals handle stress 
differently, depending on their personality—personality is one of the most significant 
moderators of stressors.52 However, all leaders, regardless of personality differences, can 
benefit from a suitable mindset, or “mental model,” when navigating the complexities of 
the modern battlefield. Stoic thought describes one such method.    
Military leaders have long found solace and wisdom in the Greco-Roman 
philosophy of stoicism.53 Originating in the Hellenistic period of ancient Greece, it is a 
philosophy that holds that errors in judgment are caused by negative emotions and are 
made when the individual’s will is in discord with nature. In The Enchiridion, Epictetus 
remarks, “Men are disturbed, not by things, but by the principles and notions which they 
form concerning things.”54 In his Meditations, Marcus Aurelius writes, “ If your distress 
has some external cause, it is not the thing itself that troubles you, but your own judgment 
51 Jennifer Kavanagh, “Stress and Performance: A Review of the Literature and Its Applicability to the 
Military,” (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2005), 17–19.  
52 Ibid., 49. 
53 Nancy Sherman, Stoic Warriors,(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2. 
54 Epictetus, Enchiridion, http://philosophy.tamu.edu/~sdaniel/Notes/enchiridion.pdf, 2. 
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of it—and you can erase this immediately.”55 The implication for the combat leader is 
that he may need to detach from the chaos of the moment, to mentally pull back from the 
surface confusion, and find a place where a holistic view of the situation is possible. 
The stoic practice of praemeditatio malorum can be tranlated as “preparing the 
mind in advance to cope with adversity.”56 This describes is a mental exercise in which 
the practitioner imagines the worst possible outcomes of whatever endeavor he is 
undertaking. For the GFC, this means envisioning the enemy’s MDCOA (Most Deadly 
Course Of Action), along with the various contingencies that can occur during the course 
of an operation, from mine strikes and personnel injuries, to damaged vehicles and 
helicopters.  
In her treatise on stoic warriors, Nancy Sherman summarizes Seneca’s views on 
negative visualization, a technique that came up repeatedly in my interviews. She writes:  
 
Given the overwhelming grip fear has on the non-wise person, Seneca 
urges that we take measures to fortify ourselves against it. At the top of his 
list is a frequent and thorough rehearsal of likely future events, which for a 
soldier would presumably include one’s own violent death. For the 
inexperienced, “a large part of evil,” he explains, “consists in its novelty.” 
But “if evil has been pondered beforehand, the blow is gentle when it 
comes.” Continual reflection on the unfamiliar, no matter how imposing 
the evil, makes for a kind of bulletproofing.57 
 
Over and over, interviewees described themselves adopting a stoic approach, 
engaging in visualization and negative visualization. For instance:  
 
Visualization—I’d run through the op, the night before or just prior to the 
operation. The same thing I did before football games in my mind. I’d also 
run through all the contingencies.  
 —A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
                                                 
55 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 79. 
56 Donald Robertson, The Philosophy of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy: Stoic Philosophy as Rational 
and Cognitive Psychotherapy (London: Karnac Books, 2010),  208. 
57 Sherman, Stoic Warriors, 117. 
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I’d think about probable actions during the operation and the enemy’s 
most deadly course of action. The ‘Aw shits” basically—reviewing 
negative events and possible responses. 
—An Army SOF Officer 
On the helicopter ride or the foot patrol in, I’d go through every scenario, 
negatively visualizing. I’d ask myself, “Right now, what would I do in this 
situation?” Even if the situation you envision doesn’t happen, it still 
primes your brain to think about events. 
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
B. VICARIOUS EXPERIENCE 
But as to exercise for the mind, the prince ought to read history and study 
the actions of eminent men, see how they acted in warfare, examine the 
causes of their victories and defeats in order to imitate the former and 
avoid the latter, and above all, do as some men have done in the past.58 
—Machiavelli, The Prince 
I read biographies of U.S. Grant, Sherman, Forrest, MacArthur, 
Hackworth, Rommel, Gap, Mao, Lawrence of Arabia, and Beckwith. I 
learned a ton about leading by example and when to take action—to have 
a bias for action but balancing that with pulling back and doing a detailed 
reading of the environment.  
—An Army SOF Officer 
Vicarious experience refers to the idea that one can learn through the actions and 
decisions of others.59 Vicarious experience can be transmitted directly by a senior 
commander or mentor in distilled fashion, in the form of prescriptive advice; reading 
first-hand historical accounts written by commanders, typically in the form of some sort 
of war memoir; or through direct observation of peers and superiors. For instance: 
58  Niccoló Machiavelli, Machiavelli: The Prince (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1952), 82–83. 
59 Gary A. Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 
1999), 179. 
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My father was a big role model for me—he was a Scout leader. He shared 
his military experiences with me. He wasn’t afraid to be outdoors in 
adverse conditions. Not all adults are comfortable in inclement weather 
and darkness. He was a church leader, and I watched him speak forcefully 
when needed. I could count the times on one hand he yelled at someone. 
He led without volume. Sometimes there is pressure to show confidence in 
your position by how loud you are. 
—An Army SOF Officer 
 
Over half of my interviewees cited combat memoirs as being helpful to their 
professional development as GFCs. Works they mentioned by name are listed in 
Appendix B. The reading of combat memoirs, or any sort of first-person account, allows 
access to the mind and perspective of another human being. Memoirs provide extra 
experiential data that can be accessed, data that can be used to find an appropriate 
analogue for whatever situation the GFC finds himself facing.  
 
[Through reading memoirs] you see what happens when decorum/etiquette 
breaks down in hard combat, so you can appreciate what being prepared 
can do for you. You see the damage that ego and overconfidence can 
bring.  
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
 
[Through reading memoirs] you see units similar to your own, in scenarios 
you could be faced with. You see how things made sense to leaders at the 
time, how they reacted.   
—A Marine Corps Officer 
 
The renowned Prussian theorist of war Carl Von Clausewitz, was a strong 
proponent of vicarious experience. According to the historian Jon Sumida,  
Clausewitz has observed that during the Napoleonic Wars, intuition had 
been improved by experience. He thus reached two primary conclusions. 
First, the primary objective of officer education should be the 
enhancement of intelligent intuition. And second, the only effective means 
of doing so during peace is to have officers replicate the experience of 
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decision-making by a commander in chief through historical reenactment 
of command decisions and to reflect on that replicated experience.60 
Clausewitz called this process of reenactment and reflection “critical analysis.”61 
Sumida boils it down to the following equations: Verifiable Historical Fact (VHF) + 
Theory-Based Historical Surmise (THS) = Synthetic Experience (SE). Then, Synthetic 
Experience (SE) + Reflection on Synthetic Experience (RSE) = Improved Capacity for 
Judgment (ICJ), or Improved Intuition.62 Essentially, reading the well-written memoir of 
a leader can provide the synthetic experience on which a GFC can reflect, thereby 
gaining improved capacity for judgment. Figure 2 illustrates the formula: 
Figure 2.  Clausewitz’s Process for the Cultivation of Intelligent Intuition, 
According to Sumida.63 
Another method of obtaining synthetic experience in GFC decision making is to 
observe them in action. Several of my respondents served on staffs prior to assuming a 
tactical command position and regarded these tours as integral to their successes as 
GFCs. Among other things, a position within a Joint Operation Center (JOC) allowed 
junior officers to learn how “business is done” at the task-force level, which thereby 
60 Jon T. Sumida, “The Clausewitz Problem,” Army History, Fall 2009, 18. 
61Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 156. 
62 Sumida, “The Clausewitz Problem,” 19. 
63 Source: Sumida, “The Relationship of History and Theory in On War,” 19. 
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exposed them to how to best leverage larger, organizational assets once they took 
command.   
The biggest thing for me was I deployed immediately after training. I got 
to serve as assistant ops. I battle-tracked GFCs from the JOC and got to 
watch the squadron commander the entire time. I went on operations with 
the GFC— I had a whole deployment preparing to be a troop commander. 
It was hugely valuable, and by the time I actually deployed as a troop 
commander, my commanding officer considered me a really experienced 
guy. 
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
In addition, a tour of this type provides a front row seat to observe GFCs in action 
on the battlefield, to listen to them make radio calls, and to see them make decisions in 
real time. Understanding how a GFC is viewed from the JOC’s perspective further 
facilitates the junior officer’s ability to “paint the picture” back to his commander once he 
is a GFC.64 Finally, staff tours allow prospective GFCs to observe how senior officers in 
command roles navigate the complexity of the modern battlefield. 
Before I deployed in a combat leadership position I served as JOC [Joint 
Operation Center] battle captain, learning the approval/de-confliction 
process for operations, the chain of command, the force laydown, the 
targeting process, the mission calls, the difference between the strike 
forces, OPORDs, planning, briefing, and execution. 
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
I did two staff rotations in a deployed JOC before I ever took command. I 
listened to GFCs make decisions on the radio, and battle tracked their 
elements. I got to see firsthand how others in leadership positions made 
decisions.  
—An Army SOF Officer 
64 Stephen M. Fiore, Karol G. Ross, and Florian Jentsch, “A Team Cognitive Readiness Framework 
for Small-Unit Training,” Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision-Making 6, no. 3 (September 1, 
2012): 332. 
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One way to provide vicarious experience to new leaders is through the 
ShadowBox method. As developed by Neil Hintze, the ShadowBox method is designed 
to “allow trainees to shadow the thinking of experts in a given field.”65 According to 
Gary Klein, 
The trainees work through scenario based materials, entering their 
information and decision priorities in a series of one-inch-square boxes. At 
the end of each scenario the trainees calibrate their interpretations with the 
conclusion of a panel of experts. Thus, the method does not require a 
subject-matter expert to facilitate the training. Hintze used this 
ShadowBox method to increase expertise of firefighters, and it is currently 
being applied to a DARPA project for developing social interaction 
skills.66 
The ShadowBox method could easily be adapted by the military. New leaders and 
perspective GFCs could read through a tactical scenario in a workbook tailored to GFC 
development, and then record their views as to what pieces of information were critical to 
resolving the scenario. They could then have the opportunity to compare their responses 
with those of experienced GFCs. This method is a cost-effective and self-paced training 
aid with great potential to improve the decision-making abilities of new leaders and 
prospective GFCs. 
C. COMPLEX, REPETITIVE TRAINING 
The best form of welfare for the troops is first class training, for this saves 
unnecessary casualties.67 
—Field Marshal Erwin Rommel 
You have to build in uncertainty. Create uncertainty in training, cultivate 
chaos/uncertainty. Some people thrive, but others don’t handle an ill-
structured environment well. Doctrine is just the opening playbook to 
65 Gary Klein, Neil Hintze, and David Saab, “Thinking inside the Box: The ShadowBox Method for 
Cognitive Skill Development,” Proceedings of the 11 The International Conference on Naturalistic 
Decision-Making (NDM 2013). Paris, France: Arpege Science Publishing, 2013, 1. 
66 Ibid., 1. 
67 Peter G. Tsouras, Warriors’ Words: A Quotation Book: From Sesostris III to Schwarzkopf 1871 BC 
to AD 1991 (London : New York: Arms & Armour Press, 1992), 440. 
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adjust to. Put surprise events into the training schedule—no notice recalls 
and tasks. 
—An International Officer 
 
I distinguish complex, repetitive training from standard, tactical-level unit 
training—which is focused primarily on battle drills, immediate action drills, or simply 
“actions at the objective.” The aim of complex, repetitive training is to simulate the 
cognitive “strains” a GFC will experience during actual combat. This is training that is 
complex because it often incorporates civilian and enemy role-players, and contains 
scenarios rife with ambiguity. If actual supporting assets cannot be employed, they can at 
least be simulated on the radio. The training needs to be repetitive in order to facilitate 
unit cohesion and to drill instinctive, intuitive, coordinated action. Complexity needs to 
infuse every repetition to the greatest extent possible to build integrated responses. 
 
You have to understand the complexity of the whole thing. Layers of ISR 
[Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance], RW [Rotary Wing], FW 
[Fixed Wing] air. It’s not something to throw someone into. Training must 
replicate this, and you must have guys observe things before getting into 
the seat. 
—An Army SOF Officer 
 
The combination of complexity and repetition allows unit personnel to create a 
“shared situational awareness.”68 Stephen Fiore, Karol Ross, and Florian Jentsch address 
this dynamic:  
 
At issue is whether current training theory can appropriately address the 
need for adaptive thinking and coordinated flexible action in response to 
unique and evolving conditions across the full range of military missions. 
Traditional training solutions and their theoretical underpinnings 
effectively support the attainment of proficiency in immediate action 
drills. However, they do not necessarily produce the types of highly 
skilled teams capable of efficiently adapting in unpredictable, high-stress 
situations. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear that the theory and training 
                                                 
68 Preston B. Cline, “Risk Management for U.S. Army Special Operations: Addressing the Need to 
Continuously Adapt to a Changing Problem Set,” February 6, 2013, 16. 
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solutions focus on the individual and team cognitive factors required for 
team-level readiness.69  
 
“Team cognition” refers to knowledge that is shared among team members so that 
advanced techniques and procedures can be automatically employed, especially when 
conditions are uncertain and time constraints exist. Team cognition is best described as an 
emergent property that derives from the interplay of the individual cognition of each team 
member and combined team behaviors.70 This shared situational awareness, or SSA, 
grows over time and as familiarity builds among team members.71 Improvement in team 
performance results from realistic training scenarios and feedback processes that spread 
lessons to the entire group.   
 
[What works are…] High-intensity, iterative training scenarios. No hand 
holding—you work as a cohesive, small unit, developing internal SOPs 
[Standard Operating Procedures]. Inter-team communications help you 
anticipate the actions of your subordinate leaders. This allows you to build 
efficiency and resilience in your tactical unit. You have to demand from 
TLs [Team Leaders] and your Troop Chief [TC] what you need in 
training, in terms of communicating. If you don’t rep it in training, [TLs/
TC] won’t give it to you in combat. Once you establish it, you won’t have 
to ping them constantly. 
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
 
Interviewees reported delegating tasks to subordinates during the execution of an 
operation, as well as consulting closely with them. However, team cognition consists of 
more than just simple delegation. It can be described as a sort of  “over-mind,” an 
unspoken anticipatory understanding shared by the group as members navigate the 
                                                 
69 Stephen M. Fiore, Karol G. Ross, and Florian Jentsch, “A Team Cognitive Readiness Framework 
for Small-Unit Training,” Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision-Making 6, no. 3 (September 1, 
2012), 326. 
70  Nancy J. Cooke, et al. “Advances in Measuring Team Cognition,” Team Cognition: Understanding 
the Factors That Drive Process and Performance (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 
2004), p239-40. 
71 Preston B. Cline, “Risk Management for U.S. Army Special Operations: Addressing the Need to 
Continuously Adapt to a Changing Problem Set,” p16-17. 
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uncertainty of the battlefield. Many interviewees reported that this type of understanding 
was shared among the GFC, Communicator, JTAC, and Senior Enlisted Leader (SEL). 
 
You have to trust your subordinates—PL [Patrol Leader] and Sergeant 
running the ground tactical piece, the JTAC [Joint Tactical Air Controller] 
controlling the air assets, your Communicator talking back to the JOC. 
Delegate authority. Think out loud about what’s going on. As the GFC, 
you are a facilitator of situational awareness. Inject over the radio when 
and where needed. 
—An Army SOF Officer 
 
In The Talent Code, Daniel Coyle investigates the root causes of world-class 
expertise among those proficient in sports and at playing musical instruments.72 He 
considers deep practice, ignition, and masterful coaching to be key. Deep practice refers 
to “chunking” the process into smaller, more manageable sub-tasks, repeating them, and 
“feeling it” or learning how to detect deviations from ideal performance. Ignition refers to 
fostering a high level of internal motivation to succeed and alludes to the drive to prevail 
over all obstacles. According to Coyle, for an organization to foster ignition, it must 
create an environment conducive to fellowship, striving, and mutual respect in the pursuit 
of a group goal or objective.73 Finally, master coaching refers both to expert advice from 
older veterans in a given discipline, and to coaching that specifically targets an 
individual’s personal development. As Coyle puts it, “the world of your organization is 
shaped like a mountain with a kind of paradise on top. Everyone strives together to scale 
the mountain.”74 Striving together is essential to creating team cognition.   
One difference to be noted between the experts Coyle studied and GFCs is that 
there is nothing that begins from a baseline steady state in a combat environment—except 
shared standard operating procedures (SOPs) and a common over-mind. Consequentially, 
                                                 
72 Daniel Coyle, The Talent Code: Greatness Isn’t Born. It’s Grown. Here’s How (New York: 
Bantam, 2009), 7. 
73 Ibid., 147. 
74 Ibid., 149. 
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complex, repetitive training is critical for creating the cohesive glue and implicit trust 
among team members that leads to effective performance as a combat unit.   
The GFC can’t do it all. The relationship with your Troop Chief and Team 
Leaders will define how things will go. It’s not just about the shooters; it’s 
about the staff, enablers—the intelligence analysts, etc. Their success is 
measured by your success. You must recognize their input. Create a 
shared understanding of the situation with your JTAC and communicator. 
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
 
D. LINKING THE THEMES 
One of the final interview questions I asked was, “In your opinion, can you name 
a quality, attribute, or trait that separates the best Ground Force Commanders you have 
observed from the rest?” By culling key words and key phrases, I was able to generate 
the following list and a word cloud based on the full answers I received.   
 
• audacity  
• purposeful 
• calm 





• calm  
• decisive  
• tactical patience 
• coup d’oeil 
• calm 
• calm 
• listen, think, pause, respond 
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• confidence, calm  
• confidence  
• calm  
• cool head 









                                                 
75 Source: “Wordle,” http://www.wordle.net/. 
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As revealed by the word cloud, “calm” was the word mentioned most often. 
While some aspect of calmness—or lack of emotional arousal—is undoubtedly 
personality-based, calm as a state of being can be cultivated through training.  
The trick to this is a little bit of acting—act like the calmest person you 
could be. There’s nothing cooler than gunfire in the background and a 
calm guy on the radio. Go overboard with this calm act; make it just over-
the-top lackadaisical, so it’s almost humorous on the other end of the 
radio. Act calm so you can get calm. 
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the three themes that emerged from my interviews all 
help GFCs and future GFCs develop the ability to stay calm in volatile, uncertain, 
complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environments. To recap, mental preparation refers to 
the mental models GFCs use to fortify themselves prior to and during operations. 
Vicarious experience refers to the idea of learning via the actions and decisions of others, 
and can be achieved through direct transmission from a senior commander or mentor, 
from reading firsthand historical accounts, or from direct observation of peers and 
superiors. Finally, the combination of complex and repetitive training allows teammates 
to develop a “shared mind.” This type of training also allows the commander to practice 
being under a strain similar to that which he will face in actual combat. 
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III. BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED 
In this chapter I address my second research question: what are the best practices 
for pre-deployment training and mission execution? In addition, I highlight a collection 
of hard-earned lessons learned by my interviewees. Several of the best practices 
identified in the following sections relate directly to the key themes discussed in Chapter 
II: mental preparation, vicarious experience, and complex, repetitive training.  
A.  PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING 
Many interviewees mentioned the utility of tactical decision games (TDGs), or 
“sand table” exercises. A TDG or sand table exercise is described as a scenario-based 
exercise that puts the student in the role of a commander facing a challenging problem.76 
TDGs are employed by military, law enforcement, and firefighting agencies to help 
inexperienced leaders prior to their actual engagement in a tactical situation. In The 
Prince, Machiavelli highlights the importance of conducting TDGs. He writes,  
 
Philopoemen, prince of the Achaei, among other praises bestowed on him 
by writers, is lauded because in times of peace he thought of nothing but 
the methods of warfare, and when he was in the country with his friends, 
he often stopped and asked them: If the enemy were on that hill and we 
found ourselves here with our army, which of us would have the 
advantage? How could we safely approach him maintaining our order? If 
we wished to retire, what ought we to do? If they retired, how should we 
follow them? And he put before them as they went along all the 
contingencies that might happen to an army, heard their opinion, gave his 
own, fortifying it by argument; so that thanks to these constant reflections 
there could never happen any incident when actually leading his armies 
for which he was not prepared.77  
 
There are several benefits to TDGs for the Ground Force Commander (GFC). 
First, they allow mental simulation of a prospective situation before the GFC is likely to 
encounter it. Gary Klein, an influential researcher in the field of decision making, 
                                                 
76 John F. Schmitt, Mastering Tactics: A Tactical Decision Game Workbook, 1994, 3. 
77 Machiavelli, The Prince, 82. 
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highlights mental simulation as an activity that experts employ when evaluating their 
potential courses of action.78 When TDGs are conducted in the presence of superiors, 
peers, and even subordinates, this puts added “pressure” on GFCs to perform proficiently. 
At the same time, the GFC can learn how other members of his unit view a problem set, 
thereby helping him assess their capabilities. Seeing everyone else’s reactions can foster 
team cognition. Meanwhile, TDGs that concentrate on ethical dilemmas can assist a GFC 
and his team to more effectively navigate the moral quandaries so prevalent on the 
battlefield. Finally, at the conclusion of a TDG, peers, subordinates, and superiors can 
offer feedback and alternative perspectives.  
 
[I benefited greatly from] lots of tactical decision games—it is difficult to 
think through problems around peers. It makes it competitive. It’s even 
more challenging around subordinates—you don’t want to let them down. 
That motivates you. 
—A Marine Corps Officer 
 
We do an O-6 level exercise every three months, and there is always a ton 
of uncertainty in the scenarios—lots of map exercises with the 
commanders. While the operators go to the range and shoot, the GFCs do 
planning, decision-making, reporting, and briefing. There’s lots of leeway 
down to lowest level of leadership. All the exercises have uncertainty built 
in. We’d do sand table exercises, talk about it, and then talk about what 
the GFCs in that situation actually did in real life.   
—An International Officer 
 
During my conventional infantry time, my battalion commander held 
leadership development seminars. We did tactical decision games and 
ethics-based ones as well.  




                                                 
78 Klein, Sources of Power, 26. 
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There were more TDGs in USMC conventional infantry versus my time in 
Marine Special Operations Command. We need moral TDGs—shoot/no 
shoot is easy; we need ambiguous ones—legal, ethical, moral, so guys can 
learn boundaries. 
—A Marine Corps Officer 
 
Several interviewees emphasized the importance of ensuring that suitable 
individuals are selected to deploy as GFCs and those who are unsuitable are weeded out. 
Some noted that not every military officer is temperamentally suited to perform under the 
stress of a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment.79 
 
Regarding tactical decision-making: 50 percent is you either have it or you 
don’t. 50 percent is to take your experience and training and build upon on 
it. You need a good selection process for the first part. 
—An Army SOF Officer 
 
Personality is 50 percent—be careful in selection. It’s not just the type of 
training, but selection is very important. Less than 50 percent of this job 
can be teachable. 
—An International Officer 
 
B. MISSION EXECUTION 
Many military thinkers have written about the primacy of intuitive, non-linear 
decision making over more rational, linear styles in the heat of battle.80 Many of my 
interviewees described engaging in pattern-matching and mental simulation schemas, 
consistent with recognition-primed decision-making (RPD).81 When asked, some were 
                                                 
79 This is corroborated in Isaac B. Tyler and Ariel C. Tyler, “Decision-Making in Chaos” (Thesis, 
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able to describe their use of System One over System Two thinking, and they could 
articulate their having had “non-rational” feelings during an operation. 
 
Yes—Going into Indian country on an operation in Afghanistan, I got the 
feeling we went too far into a valley and decided to turn back. I got AWT 
[aerial weapons team] overhead. We had almost walked into an L-shaped 
ambush. I just didn’t have a good feeling about it. 
—An Army SOF Officer 
 
Many times—it just felt right. I attribute this to TDGs, it’s hard to tell. I 
used pattern matching from prior experiences. Situations just didn’t seem 
right and I had to make a quick decision. 
—A Marine Corps Officer 
 
Yes, my hair stands up—I think it’s keying in on certain environmental 
factors. It is an accumulation of all the experiences you have had. By the 
time I was a GFC, I’d been on 200–300 operations. This one operation, I 
made the call to back off a barricaded shooter in a house. I got criticized 
for it, but later on we discovered the guy had a suicide vest on. It was just 
a gut call. 
—An Army SOF Officer 
 
Here is how some interviewees described their decision-making ‘method’ when 
asked the following question:   
Think back to an operation where you encountered a great deal of uncertainty 
(conflicting/ambiguous/lack of information). How did you weigh competing priorities 
when making a decision? 
 
If you can’t develop the situation further, then you must make a decision. 
Can we come back another day?  Can we continue? 
—An International Officer 
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You have to figure out quickly, what is the most important thing? You’re 
not going to be multi-tasking; you have to figure out the priorities. 
Delegate what is not important. #1 is safety of force, TIC [troops in 
contact], injury to personnel—it should drown out the rest, and you can 
circle back later.  
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
 
 
Number one, what is the danger to guys? Number two, is the partner force 
capable of handling this? Finally, number three, is it worth it? 
—An Army SOF Officer 
 
Like everyone else in a small tactical element, the GFC is under a great deal of 
stress, primarily caused by situations that are novel, unpredictable, and uncontrollable.82 
In addition, his cognitive load—that is, his cognitive processing capacity—is strained by 
the VUCA environment of the battlefield.83 Both his stress levels and cognitive load can 
be mitigated by experience and mental preparation.84 As we have seen, personal 
experience is comprised of both direct, individual experience and the vicarious 
experience gleaned from TDGs, staff tours, reading military memoirs, as well as from 
previous training.   
Respondents were asked, Please describe the mindset/mental model that you 
typically employ to handle stress and uncertainty during an operation; In particular, was 
there something you did to avoid information overload? Here are two telling responses: 
Focus on keeping things in perspective. After a sudden change, 
immediately ask yourself “What can I do to control this/make it better?” 
Initiate that, and then seek more information. For example, say you 
observe one of your mobility elements hit a huge IED [improvised 
explosive device] strike. First, you call for air, then turn back to get 
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updates on the situation. Something just happened; you raise your 
readiness and then bring other forces and assets to bear. What information 
do I really need, right now? Do we need Medevac, assets, QRF [Quick 
Reaction Force], etc.? 
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
 
One of my instructors in the Alpha course used to say, ‘You don’t want to 
have a helmet fire.’85 Delegate as much as possible, to your 
communicator, your JTAC [Joint Terminal Air Controller], and your 
Team Sergeant. 
—An Army SOF Officer 
 
Regarding the training, mentorship, experiences, or tools that helped individuals 
avoid information overload: 
 
A Master Chief at BUD/S [Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL 
training]—he talked a lot about mental toughness, controlling your 
breathing, pulse, talking about philosophy. During Pool Comp at BUD/
S—you’re put under lots of physiological stress.86 Can you stick to the 
game plan in face of all the surf hits? This is why we have such an anal 
attention to detail. You’re not expected to invent something totally new in 
the heat of battle—execute your emergency action plan. Buy yourself time 
and space, and then think of something new. 
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
 
I can’t pinpoint it, but [I learned from] watching different leaders, 
repetitively over time. How they handle things differently. You observe 
right and wrong. Over time, it becomes part of you. It becomes more tools 
for your proverbial toolbox. 
—An International SOF Officer 
 
                                                 
85 The Alpha course is part of the training pipeline for Army Special Forces Officers.  
86 Pool Comp is a training evolution during 2nd Phase of basic SEAL training.   
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Some of it is engrained in training but also through 100 firefights. A part 
comes with time and experience. Some of it is the structure of the job, 
what you need to report to higher. Guys know what needs to be passed 
over comms immediately, and what can wait. A lot of this can be done in 
training. 
—A Marine Corps Officer 
 
C. LESSONS LEARNED   
Guys need to read AARs [After Action Reports]! We pride ourselves on 
creating them, but guys just don’t read them. At a minimum, it helps you 
create more precise questions to ask prior to turnover. 
—An Army SOF Officer 
 
There are venues in which both unclassified and classified lessons are published, 
but few Special Operations Force (SOF) personnel review them.87 The broad consensus 
from interviewees is that the knowledge-management software currently employed by 
SOF is not utilized at the tactical unit-level. It is unclear from my research whether this is 
due to ignorance about how to leverage this resource, whether the software itself is 
prohibitively unwieldy, or whether the information it holds is considered unhelpful. 
However, it is common around units, though, to hear GFCs say: 
 
 
I wrote them [AARs], but they’re probably lost somewhere out in the 
ether. 
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
 
Your AAR just goes into a black hole.  
—An Army SOF Officer 
 
                                                 
87 “Center for Army Lessons Learned | U.S. Army Combined Arms Center,” 
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AARs aren’t focused on the GFC perspective—it’s typically mission and 
tactics. But, as a good GFC you can glean insights into the leader’s 
thinking from their writing.   
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
 
However, as this last quote indicates, even when AARs from other units are read, 
there is no section that focuses on how the commander made decisions, what factors he 
prioritized over others, or whether hindsight caused him to reflect on anything he could 
have done better.   
Over the course of an operational career, GFCs make many decisions and develop 
a great deal of subject-matter expertise related to combat leadership. Unfortunately, 
unless a GFC has a follow-on tour in a training command, no one but his immediate 
subordinates will benefit from what he has learned about decision-making, prioritizing, 
and delegating under stress. Even worse, should the GFC leave the military, this hard 
won “experience capital” leaves with him. What he has internalized becomes lost to 
tactical units and the larger parent institution.  
The following excerpts exemplify just some of the knowledge that is not being 
captured in any systematic way. Interviewees were asked to speak on the topic of errors, 
mistakes, or lessons learned pertaining to decision making while conducting an operation: 
 
There was a vehicle we had stopped at a static checkpoint with an HVT 
[high value target] inside, but we didn’t have approval to arrest the guy, so 
we let him go. In hindsight it would have been better to detain him, and 
then risk the consequences afterward. I should have recognized the 
narrow, fleeting opportunity that we really had for such an elusive figure.  
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
 
The biggest one is failure to think—stop, think, and then speak. Then you 
usually go with your first blush gut instinct. During most engagements 
guys will get tunnel vision on the problem. They forget about the assets 
they have, focus on solving it yourself—they need to be more holistic. In 
my first combat experience, we took an RPG to the front of our Humvee, 
and I was too amped up. In training I always asked, “Is there another 
way?” Speak slowly; speak clearly on the radio—see ahead of what you’re 
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saying instead of being the guy having a mouth spasm. I slowed back 
down a lot after that first op.   
—An Army SOF Officer 
 
There is a preset template, which gets to an 80 percent solution—target 
fidelity, weather, etc. When the template says go, there is still 20 percent 
of the op that is a judgment call—susceptible to emotion and swaying by 
other guys. So of that 20 percent, maybe half of that is a bad call—you 
accept that and hope that 10 percent of operations is not a mass casualty. 
Take as much decision-making out of the way so it’s not emotional.   
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
 
[Just a general] lack of tactical patience, not setting conditions for the next 
phase. If things aren’t ready, don’t rush it. 
—An Army SOF Officer 
 
During pre-mission planning you can minimize, at least bound the 
intuitive decisions that have to be made, by making good contingency 
plans. Essentially, you’re making decisions in advance through planning. 
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer. 
 
Take the extra time to think through decisions, not a lot—even just a few 
more seconds. Things seem like they are happening faster than they are. 
Take a slight pause to get all the information that you need. Talk less, 
listen more. Figure out what information you need to take in and what you 
need to pass up. 
—A Marine Corps Officer 
 
You can make all the right calls and things will still go bad—this is war. 
On the ops that went well, I stuck to hard and fast requirements: go/no go 
criteria, minimum force. The times things got hairy, either the intelligence, 
weather, or environment were near the minimum thresholds. I never went 
unless my Troop Chief said yes to an op. 
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
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[I’ve seen a] lack of experience leading to anxiety, a desire to do 
something, or a sense of urgency to do something. Being bored, 
overwhelmed and complacent in routine by default. Just getting in “copy 
and paste” mode from past situations. 
—An International Officer 
 
The GFC thinking he’s out there alone. They treat the JOC [Joint 
Operations Center] as people they are doing a job for. The mindset should 
be “[The JOC] works for you.”  There are hundreds of people and assets 
that work for you. Tell them; direct them to what you need. Don’t ask 
permission, give the squadron commander your intent—drive the train in 
the rear, and make the squadron commander change the plan if he wants 
to. 
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
 
Realizing that flexibility is the most important thing. Intensity cannot last- 
apathy is the other extreme. Balance between intensity and apathy. Some 
of it is personality—some is experience. You must have a sense of ease, 
an understanding of the environment. A lot of this comes from experience. 
As time goes by, more things make sense. Be mentally aggressive, staying 
flexible for contingencies. This has to start early in career, prior to pre-
mission training. 
—An International Officer 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has focused on best practices for the GFC, for both pre-mission 
training and mission execution. It has highlighted the importance of Tactical Decision 
Games in preparing a GFC to deal with the uncertainty and time constraints he will 
encounter on the battlefield. Ground Force Commanders already use a number of 
techniques to avoid becoming overwhelmed by the cognitive strain of combat. They also 
amass implicit, or tacit, knowledge. Unfortunately, right now, no real emphasis is placed 
on shaping and refining these techniques, this tacit knowledge. Nevertheless, we are in 
the midst of the longest period of sustained conflict in American history. Surely, there is 
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more that can be done to capture and transmit decision-making tactics, techniques, and 
procedures so as to better to prepare and assist the next generation of GFCs.   
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IV. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the 
unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in 
the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads 
to the truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it 
may lead. The first of these qualities is described by the French term, coup 
d’oeil; the second is determination.88 
—Clausewitz, On War 
 
A. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has focused on the decision-making of Special Operations Force 
(SOF) Ground Force Commanders (GFC). My goal has been to address how to improve 
tactical-level decision making under conditions of uncertainty to better prepare combat 
leaders for current and future operating environments. Through my research I have 
sought to identify the characteristics of effective GFC decision making. I have also 
sought commonalities across the experiences of the GFCs I interviewed, who combined 
have conducted over 5,000 operations. My aim has been to identify best practices for pre-
mission preparation and mission execution. Finally, a tremendous amount of implicit 
knowledge resides in those who have experience as GFCs. Their knowledge needs to be 
more systematically captured and transmitted. 
Three themes emerged from my interviews with 21 experienced GFCs. Mental 
preparation, vicarious experience, and complex, repetitive training are critical to effective 
GFC decision making.  
“Mental preparation” refers to the mental models which GFCs use to prepare 
themselves to interact with the uncertainty of the battlefield—how they fortify their 
perspectives and thoughts to enable decisive command in chaotic environments. 
“Vicarious experience” refers to the idea of learning through the actions and decisions of 
                                                 
88 Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition,  102. 
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others. It can be achieved through direct transmission from a senior commander or 
mentor, from reading first-person accounts written by commanders, or from direct 
observation of peers and superiors in senior leadership positions. Finally, “complex 
repetitive training” allows GFCs and prospective GFCs to create a “shared reality” 
among their team members. This training also allows commanders to place themselves 
under a cognitive strain similar to the strain they will experience in actual combat.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are organized according to their level of 
implementation, whether by the larger institution, the tactical-level unit, or the individual 
GFC.   
1. Institutional Level—Record first-hand accounts from combat leaders.  
New members of combat units are hungry to learn the ins and outs of their chosen 
community. A program designed to capture and pass along lessons learned by 
experienced enlisted and officer leaders in video format would be an easy way to transmit 
knowledge. It would require little effort and no coordination beyond the initial recording. 
The videos could be made readily accessible, and users could view them whenever 
convenient. Essentially, they would serve as a self-paced reference, a set of “video 
memoirs” that unit members could access for professional development. This could be 
done at the classified level and put on secure servers so operational minutiae could be 
adequately captured.   
 
[We should] figure out why people made bad decisions—what were the 
factors/situation? Build TDGs [Tactical Decision Games] based on real 
events. This stuff is hard to convey in AARs [After Action 
Report]/Lessons learned templates.  
—A Marine Corps Officer 
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2. Institutional Level—Employ the ShadowBox method to develop GFC 
cognitive skills.   
Tactical-level units’ parent organizations should develop a ShadowBox tool kit 
based on their experienced leaders’ responses to scenarios to help incoming leaders work 
through these same scenarios. This is a cost-effective method to transmit implicit 
knowledge from experienced GFCs to prospective ones, providing a window into expert 
thinking in various combat scenarios.89  As with the “video memoirs,” ShadowBoxes 
could be made available organization-wide so that units and individuals could make use 
of them during off-duty hours, and could refer back to them while deployed. 
3. Institutional and Unit Level—Ensure that training is holistic.    
Many times, units are forced by budgetary and time constraints to focus on 
singular aspects of mission requirements. Units must resist the urge to train sequentially 
on only one or two tactics, techniques, or procedures (TTPs) for the sake of simplicity 
and expedience. It is imperative that commanders train under simulated complexity—
ideally the same kind of complexity they will face in the deployed environment. This 
means VUCA-like scenarios with role-players and OPFOR, the execution of mission 
contingencies, the employment of multiple air assets and supporting elements, and 
reporting requirements by an intrusive higher headquarters. Much of this complexity can 
be simulated by role-players on the radio. This must all also be done repetitively in order 
to drill the GFC and his unit to respond intuitively, and with coup d’oeil.  
 
We need to maintain realistic training scenarios, more realistic assets for 
operation, we need to train accurately for multiple theaters, and return to 
large-scale C2 [Command and Control] ops. 
—A Naval Special Warfare Officer 
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4. Unit Level—Increase use of TDGs.   
Although many units already employ TDGs and sand table exercises, in general 
they are under-utilized when it comes to preparing a GFC to deal with the pressures and 
uncertainties of the battlefield. This assertion is based both on my personal experience as 
a GFC and on the interview data. TDGs force timely decision making under pressure, but 
also promote team awareness by revealing how GFCs and their teammates are likely to 
react under different conditions. They also provide a venue in which seniors can pass 
tacit practical knowledge onto subordinates. In the past, Naval Special Warfare has 
attempted to foster the use of TDGs by including them in each issue of Ethos magazine.90 
Emphasis from senior leaders and time granted for TDGs would doubtless spur more 
interest in them by tactical level elements.  
5. Individual Level—Emphasize reading for professional development 
and mental preparation.  
This is not a novel recommendation, but important nonetheless. In professional 
courses, reading is encouraged and recommended at every stage of a leader’s career. It is 
up to individuals to discipline themselves to accomplish this task during their off-duty 
hours. The cultivation of a detached mindset and negative visualization can and should be 
developed by individuals to prepare for the fog and friction of war. This is the building 
block of unit success, and only individuals can do this for themselves; no one else can do 
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C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
What caused you to reach overload/OBE [Overcome By Events]? Too 
many inputs? Where is the line and what caused you to be overwhelmed? 
—An Army SOF Officer 
 
Future research should determine how far GFCs can be pushed before they 
experience cognitive failure. A better understanding of the situational and dispositional 
factors involved in information overload would help all of us recognize the warning signs 
of its onset. Ideally, pushing current and future GFCs into information overload can be 
done under field (training) conditions rather than in a laboratory setting to better simulate 
the rigors of combat, and test warning signs and gauge breaking points.   
In the fictionalized vignette that opened this thesis, CK, Harper, Jonas, Rick, and 
the rest of their force performed well in the chaotic, VUCA environment of combat. Why 
they did so should now be apparent. CK’s SEAL platoon had conducted complex, 
repetitive training prior to deployment, which led to implicit trust among team members 
and cohesive mission execution. On deployment, they drilled their Afghan counterparts 
constantly, and rehearsed contingencies before every operation. They conducted sand 
table exercises to anticipate enemy actions. CK also handled the cognitive strain as well 
as he did because he “trained like he fought.” He prepared himself mentally to deal with 
worst-case scenarios he had already envisioned in his head. Thanks to a prior staff tour, 
CK had vicarious experience he could draw from. From reading memoirs and poems like 
“Arithmetic on the Frontier” about the British experience in Afghanistan in the 1878 
Anglo-Afghan war, he had analogues and context to refer to. These are some of the key 
factors that, together, helped CK and his platoon succeed on the battlefield.   
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APPENDIX A.  INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1.  Please think back to any pre-military experiences you had in making decisions 
under stress: street fights, sports- any difficult and uncertain situations that you 
can recall. What lessons did you draw from them? 
 
2. Whom do you admire as a leader (military or non-military) and why?  
 
3. What lessons have you adapted from those leaders into your own style?  
 
4. Prior to deploying overseas, what was the most helpful part of training with 
regard to decision making as a Ground Force Commander (GFC)? 
 
5. Can you describe anything you did prior to deployment to increase your 
readiness, outside of work, such as reading or research? 
 
6. Please describe any professional development/mentoring (if any) that your unit 
leadership or training cadre conducted with you pertaining to decision-making 
prior to or during deployment.   
 
7. During pre-deployment/mission training, do you feel your unit and training cadre 
spent adequate time on the GFC portion of full mission profiles? What could be 
done to make pre-deployment/mission training better and/or more effective for 
GFCs? 
 
8. Did you have any pre-mission rituals to facilitate your performance and focus 
during an operation (mental dirt dives, music, meditation, or prayer)?   
 
9. Think back to when you’ve either made a decision or contributed to a decision on 
whether or not to launch on an operation. If in retrospect it was the correct call, 
how did you come to that conclusion? If it was the wrong call, can you identify an 
error in your thought process? 
 
10. Are you familiar with dual process theory for cognition (Thinking, Fast and Slow. 
System 1—fast, implicit, unconscious, System 2—slow, explicit, conscious)?  Did 
you ever use your intuition or a “non-rational” feeling while conducting an 
operation? What did that feel like? What made you decide to favor your intuition 
over a more conscious, rational process? 
 
11. On Mission: Think back to an operation where you encountered a great deal of 
uncertainty (conflicting/ambiguous/lack of information). How did you weigh 
competing priorities when making a decision during the operation?   
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12. Please describe the mindset/mental model that you typically employ to handle 
stress and uncertainty during an operation. In particular, was there something you 
did to avoid information overload? 
 
13. What training, mentorship, experiences, or tools helped you arrive at this 
strategy? 
 
14. What are some mistakes pertaining to decision-making that either you have made 
or seen made by other GFCs while conducting an operation? 
 
15. What do you feel needs to be captured about the experience of SOF GFCs over 
the past 15 years to ensure that lessons learned will not be lost or forgotten? 
 
16. Did your unit have a process or means of capturing lessons learned from the GFC 
perspective, besides some sort of hotwash/group AAR? What was useful or not 
useful about it? 
 
17. What readings/books have proven valuable for professional development 
pertaining to decision making as a SOF leader? 
 
18. What were key takeaways from it/them? 
 
19. In your opinion, can you name a quality, attribute, or trait that separates the best 
Ground Force Commanders you have observed from the rest?   
 
20. Thinking back on your experience as a leader, from the first operation you led 
until now, what lessons have you learned about tactical decision making that 
perhaps aren’t obvious? What would you tell your younger self before you 
stepped off the FOB or conducted an operation for the first time?  
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